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EQUITY-1960 TENNESSEE SURVEY
T. A. SMEDLEY*

I. BILL To REMOVE CLOUD ON TITLE
II. PARTIAL SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WITH COMPENSATION
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CHANCERY CASES
IV. INJUNCTION AGAINST COUNTY'S PERPETRATION OF A NUISANCE

V.

RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN CHANCERY CASES

VI. JURISDICTION To INVESTIGATE CHARGES OF UNETHICAL CONDUCT
*

*%

*

While no decisions involving momentous developments in equity
jurisprudence have been handed down during the past year, the
Tennessee Chancery Courts have on several occasions demonstrated
a tendency to free themselves from artificial restrictions on the operation of traditional equitable remedies. Illustrating this inclination are
cases which resulted in decrees removing a cloud on title, granting
partial specific performance of a land sale contract, awarding punitive
damages, and granting injunctive relief against a county's perpetration of a nuisance. Another series of cases contributed some clarifying
rulings regarding the scope of the right to jury trial in chancery
proceedings.
I. BILL To REMOVE CLOUD ox TIE
Perhaps the most noteworthy case is one which is significant, not
because the decision laid down any new rule of law, but because
the court evidenced a healthy attitude of keeping equitable procedures
and remedies flexible enough to provide relief whenever a party is
in need of the aid of equity to protect his rights. This case, Patterson
v. I. T. Moss Tie Co.,' arose out of a simple boundary dispute, and the
bill was filed under Code sections 16-606 and -607 for the purpose of
establishing the boundary line. The complaint was treated as a bill
quia timet to remove a cloud on title, and the liberal nature of the
Tennessee concept of such bills was thus demonstrated in the decision.
The main question as to the propriety of such a bill in this situation
arose from the fact that plaintiffs, though previously owners of the
land in question, had, prior to the dispute regarding the boundary, conveyed it by warranty deed to a third party who took and continued
to hold possession. Defendant therefore contended that the bill could
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Illinois and Virginia

Bars.
1. 330 S.W.2d 344 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
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not be maintained because: (1) complainants were not the owners
of legal title and were not in possession of the disputed property; (2)
any fear as to complainants' liability on their covenants of warranty
was purely speculative; and (3) no cloud existed on the title to the
land because defendant had not made any formal claim to it, but
rather had merely caused a new survey to be made, which would
place the boundary line well over on the property complainants' deed
purported to convey to the third party. The chancellor, rejecting all
three contentions, overruled defendant's demurrer and granted the
relief requested and the court of appeals affirmed.
Little difficulty was encountered with the third contention, since
the rule in Tennessee,2 as in other jurisdictions, 3 is that a party may
invoke the jurisdiction of equity to prevent the creation of a cloud on
title, on the same grounds on which he may petition for the removal
of an existing cloud on title. The second ground for the demurrer
was more substantial, since traditionally equity will not interfere to
give relief, especially in a controversy over title to land, unless complainant can show an urgent threat of irreparable injury.4 However,
the court adopted the view that "bills quia timet lie where a person
has reasonable fears of being subjected to future inconvenience,
probable or even possible to happen by neglect, inadvertence or
culpability of another, in which case the court will quiet his apprehensions by removing the cause. '' 5 Although the disputed boundary
might be settled without litigation, yet "complainants' right to invoke
the aid of a Court of Equity for the purpose of avoiding possible
future liability under their covenant of warranty, is not dependent
on the form which such future possible liability may take." 6 And
although complainants might wait and raise a successful defense
when sued on their warranty, they ought to be allowed to defend
the title of their vendee "by an aggressive anticipatory action," if
7
they choose to do so.
Defendant's first argument presented the most formidable obstacle
2. Jones v. Nixon, 102 Tenn. 95, 98-99, 50 S.W. 740, 741 (1899): "Strictly
speaking, the present bill is not brought to remove a cloud from title, but it
is intended, rather, to prevent the consummation of a proceeding that would,
unhindered, result in obscuring that title. The difference is not one of controlling importance, however, for the jurisdiction of courts of equity to
grant the desired relief is as well established in the one case as in the other,
and the principles authorizing the prevention of clouds are, generally, the
same as those applied in removing clouds."
3. Bishop v. Moorman, 98 Ind. 1, 49 Am. Rep. 731 (1884); King v. Townshend, 141 N.Y. 358, 36 N.E. 513 (1894); See cases cited in Jones v. Nixon,
supra note 2; CLARK, EQUITY § 332 (1954).
4. See WALSH, EQUITY §§ 28, 31 (1930).
5. 330 S.W.2d at 349, quoting 2 GIBSON, SUITS

1956).
6. 330 S.W.2d at 351.
7. 330 S.W.2d at 350.

IN CHANCERY

§ 1089 (5th ed.
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to granting relief because it was based on the oft-declared proposition
that equity will not take jurisdiction to remove a cloud on title
unless the complainant is owner of legal title to and is in possession
of the land in question. 8 However, these requirements are traditional
ones which were originally imposed at a time when the equity courts
were necessarily cautious not to infringe on the jurisdiction of the
common law courts, and were designed to prevent persons from
coming into equity to settle controversies cognizable at law in the
form of ejectment actions. Thus, if a complainant was not in possession of the land, his course should be to pursue his ejectment remedy
against the party claiming an adverse interest in the property. If the
complainant was already in possession, of course he could not maintain an ejectment action, and so his remedy at law might be inadequate. The legal title, requirement apparently arose as an incident
to the possession factor: a complainant who was out of possession
attempted to demonstrate that his remedy at law was inadequate
because he had only equitable title to the property, and so had no
standing to sue in a law court. The answer was that he should first
perfect his interest by obtaining legal title, and then bring an ejectment action.
Even under a system in which a sharp division existed between
the common law and equity courts, there were two obvious faults in
this line of reasoning-both of which are illustrated by the situation
in the Patterson case. First, a party, even though out of possession,
may still not have an adequate remedy in ejectment, because his
interest may be non-possessory in nature, or because possession may
be in some third party rather than in the person whose claims are
clouding the title. Second, a party with a less-than-legal-title interest
in the land may not have the right to obtain legal title, but may
nevertheless have a real interest needing protection. In the Patterson
case complainants had no right to possession since their vendees were
rightfully in possession; and their interest in avoiding liability under
their warranty of course gave them no basis for obtaining legal
title. In Tennessee, where the early distinction between common law
and equity has been so largely erased and where the chancery courts
have concurrent jurisdiction with the law courts over so many types
of cases, it would be particularly anomalous for equity to deny relief
on the basis of a rule which originated in an era of hostility between
the two branches of jurisprudence and existed to prevent encroachment by equity on the jurisdiction of the common law courts.
Because the requirement of possession denied equitable relief to all
holders of non-possessory interests, and the requirement of legal
8. Frost v. Spitley, 121 U.S. 552 (1887); see CLARK, EQuITy § 330 (1954);
MCCLINTOCK, EQuTY § 194 (2d ed. 1948).
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title resulted in equity's refusing to protect the very interests which
it alone recognized as existent, some very unfortunate results were
produced by adherence to this traditional view. Consequently, courts
in a number of states have rejected these factors as prerequisites to
equity's jurisdiction to remove cloud on title.9 Tennessee has maintained an especially enlightened point of view in this respect for
over a century. As long ago as 1859, in Almony v. Hicks, the Tennessee Supreme Court declared that a bill to remove cloud on title "will
lie, although the defendants are in possession, and complainants have
the legal title, and might sue at law for the recovery of the property,
that not being esteemed adequate relief."' 10 Sixty years ago, this rule
was applied in Jones v. Nixon,1 where, as in the Patterson case,
a vendor of land sought a bill to remove cloud because a third party's
claim to the property created the fear of a suitby the vendees on the
covenants of warranty. Recognizing that many jurisdictions refuse
relief unless the complainant is in possession and that ordinarily a
person not holding legal title has no standing to seek this form of
relief, the court nevertheless declared that an exception should be
made "in favor of the vendor of land with warranty of title, his obligation to protect the title of his vendee being deemed a sufficient
interest in the subject-matter to authorize his timely interposition
and warrant the aid of a Court of Equity."' 2 The current decision
in the Patterson case is thus based on sound Tennessee authority as
well as on good reason.
Further, it may be commended as carrying the tendency to grant
quia timet relief liberally at least a short step further than the
earlier cases. Here there was somewhat less of an urgent threat to
complainants' interest than was involved in the Jones case. 13 Also,
in the Pattersoncase the court extended the rule that legal title is not
9. See CLARK, EQurTY § 330 (1930); MCCLLNTOCK, EQUITY § 194 (2d ed.
1948); WALsH, EQurrY § 117 (1930).

10. 40 Tenn. 39, 42 (1859). There, defendant claimed under a deed from
complainant's ancestor, which deed was valid on its face and would embarrass complainant's ownership as long as it remained outstanding. Therefore,
equity took jurisdiction in order to cancel the deed, an element of relief which
a law court could not provide. However, it may still be proper, in states
maintaining the division between law and equity, to refuse to allow a party
to use a bill to remove cloud as a substitute for an ejectment action. See
Chandler v. Graham, 123 Mich. 327, 82 N.W. 814 (1900).
11. Supra note 2.
12. 102 Tenn. at 102, 50 S.W. at 741-42. The view that relief can be granted
even when defendant is in possession of the disputed property was approved
in Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Patton, 134 Tenn. 556, 184 S.W. 855 (1916).
13. In Jones v. Nixon, supra note 2, by some mistake the land in question
had been sold under a chancery court decree as part of the assets of an
estate to which it did not belong. Though the sale had not yet been confirmed
by the court, the purchaser's claim obviously constituted a present burden on
the title which complainant had conveyed to his grantee. In the Patterson
case, the lumber company apparently had not yet made any positive claim to
the disputed territory.
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a prerequisite for relief to a suit brought under a statute conferring
jurisdiction over boundary dispute cases on chancery courts, even
though the statute prescribes that the complainant must "prove
clearly that he is the true owner of the lands described in his bill."'14
By treating the complaint as a bill quia timet, the court was able
to base complainants' qualification to sue on the more flexible tests
adhered to by Tennessee equity courts.
II. PARTIAL SPECIFIC PERFORMiANCE WITH COMPENSATION
In Hall v. Snipes,15 the court, perhaps in dictum, shed some further
light on the law in Tennessee regarding the remedy of partial specific
performance with compensation. Defendant Snipes had contracted
to purchase certain Mississippi property from Hall for $140,000 cash
and certain Tennessee property owned by defendant. The contract
stated that it was contingent on part of the Tennessee property being
rezoned for commercial use, and when it became apparent that this
rezoning could not be accomplished by the time set for the consummation of the contract, defendant first asked plaintiff to waive the
condition, but then without waiting for a reply defendant attempted
to cancel the contract on the ground of impossibility of performance.
Nevertheless, plaintiff promptly declared his waiver of the rezoning
condition, and demanded that the contract be performed. Defendant
instead purchased from a third party other Mississippi property for
which he had previously been negotiating, conveying the Tennessee
property as part of the consideration for this purchase. Plaintiff sued
for damages or specific performance but the chancery court held that
defendant's cancellation of the contract was validly made, and so
dismissed the suit.
The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the rezoning provision
was inserted in the contract for plaintiff's benefit, and that he had
a right to waive the condition and had effectively done so. Therefore,
defendant was held to have breached the contract, and the case was
remanded "for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of damages
recoverable by complainants and/or for such other relief as they may
be entitled to have granted to them."'1 6 The latter reference was
apparently made in recognition of the possibility that plaintiff might
seek partial specific performance with compensation at the retrial,
and the court of appeals observed that plaintiff's right to sue for
14. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 16-607 (1956).

15. 330 S.W.2d 381 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959). Under the title of Richardson
v. Snipes, the broker's action against Snipes for his commission was consolidated with the vendor's action for damages or specific performance. That
phase of the litigation presented no equity aspects, and will not be discussed
here.
16. 330 S.W.2d at 391.
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breach of contract "is, in our opinion, completely analogous to and
entirely in harmony with the well-settled rule that where a contract
is entered into for the sale of land and the seller is unable to convey
all of the land contracted for, the buyer may, nevertheless, enforce
specific performance for that portion which the seller can convey,
together with compensation for that portion which the seller cannot
convey."17
While the result reached is certainly acceptable, the statement relating the specific performance remedy to the damages right of action
is somewhat puzzling. Once the validity of plaintiff's waiver of the
condition was established, the case clearly became one in which defendant had been bound by a valid contract which he breached by
refusing to go through with the land sale. The right of action for
damages was quite independent of the alternative remedy of partial
specific performance, and the two remedies are "entirely in harmony"
only in the sense that plaintiff could choose to pursue either one which
suited his purposes better. And the right to damages hardly can be
''completely analogous" to the remedy of partial specific performance
with compensation. In enforcing the former right, plaintiff's theory is
that, defendant having repudiated a binding contract, neither party
shall perform his obligations under the contract but defendant shall
be required to compensate plaintiff for the loss of the advantage he
would have received from the fulfillment of the agreement. In pursuing the latter remedy, plaintiff's theory is that defendant shall be
required to perform to the extent he is still able to fulfil his obligations, and in return plaintiff shall perform his own obligations except
to the extent that he is entitled to be excused from performance because of defendant's inability to perform fully. Thus, the one approach is that the original duties of both parties to carry out their
contract obligations are at an end, while the other approach is that
the obligations of both parties to perform are still existent and such
performance is sought to be obtained.
The intimation that plaintiff may still seek specific performance on
remand indicates the commendably liberal view of the Tennessee
courts in regard to the granting of partial specific performance with
compensation. It is to be noted that the contract originally called for
an exchange of tracts of land. Since defendant could no longer convey
the Tennessee property to complainant, enforcement of the partial
specific performance remedy would result in defendant's being required to pay plaintiff the $140,000 cash part of the purchase price,
while complainant would be required to convey to defendant a portion
of the Mississippi property which bears the same ratio to the whole
17. 330 S.W.2d at 388.
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tract as defendant's payment of the $140,000 bears to the whole
of defendant's promised performance. In order to administer such
relief, the court would be faced with the dual difficulties of (1) evaluating the Tennessee property in order to ascertain what portion of
defendant's total promised performance was represented by the obligation to convey this tract, and (2) determining how much and what
part of the Mississippi tract plaintiff should be allowed to retain as
a means of reducing his performance in the same proportion that
defendant's performance has become impossible. The difficulty of
making such evaluations of land tracts, and the consequent possibility
that enforcing performances differing from those originally contracted
for will cause hardship to defendant, have made courts somewhat
reluctant to decree partial specific performance with compensation
in land exchange contracts. 18
No Tennessee case has been found in which partial specific performance of a land exchange contract has actually been decreed, but more
than a century ago the Tennessee court declared the vendee's general
right to partial specific performance in unqualified terms.' 9 Further
a later decision went so far as to grant such relief to a vendor who
was unable to convey part of the land promised, as against a vendee
who attempted to abrogate the entire contract because he could not
obtain all of the land for which he contracted. 20 Since the vendor is
the defaulting party, courts are generally inclined to refuse to grant
him a form of relief which forces the non-defaulting party to accept
less than he contracted for, thereby imposing on him a contract to
which he never assented.2' However in the Vernon case, the Tennessee court found that the vendor's inability to convey related to only
an insignificant part of the land called for by the contract, and that a
proportionate deduction from the purchase price would fully compensate the vendee for the loss of that part. Therefore, partial specific
performance with compensation was decreed under the rule that:
When a vendor is unable, from any cause not involving bad faith
on his part, to convey each and every parcel of the land contracted to be
18. See Waldeck v. Hedden, 89 Cal. App. 485, 265 Pac. 340, 343-44 (1928);
Ryan v. Evans, 195 Ind. 570, 145 N.E. 6, 9 (1925); Williams v. Pearman, 164
S.W. 43 at 44-45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 177 (2d ed.
1948); 3 Wis. L. REv. 173 (1925) (better view said to be that such relief
should be granted in land-exchange contracts on same basis as in land-formoney contracts).
19. Collins v. Smith, 38 Tenn. 251, 255 (1858): "It is settled as a general
rule, that the purchaser, if he chooses, is entitled to have the contract
specifically performed, as far as the vendor can perform it, and to have an
abatement out of the purchase-money, for any deficiency in the title of the
estate."
20. Charles B. James' Land & Inv. Co. v. Vernon, 129 Tenn. 637, 168 S.W. 156
(1914).
21. CLARK, EQUITY § 121 (1954); 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1407
(5th ed. 1941).
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sold, and it is apparent that the part which cannot be conveyed is of

small importance, or is immaterial to the purchaser's enjoyment of that
which may be conveyed to him, in such case the vendor may insist on
performance with compensation to the purchaser, or a proportionate
abatement from the agreed price, if that has not been paid.22
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CHANCERY CASES
The question of the power of Tennessee equity courts to award

punitive damages, an issue discussed in last year's Survey,23 was
further explored in Kneeland v. Bruce.24 This was a suit in chancery
in which a person who formerly owned a tract of land charged that
defendants, by fraudulent conspiracy, had caused her unwittingly
to mortgage her property and then to lose it through foreclosure of
the mortgage. Plaintiff sought, and the jury awarded, both compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Western Section treated the case as one for damages for fraud and
deceit, over which the chancery court had jurisdiction under Tennessee Code section 16-602. In response to defendants' argument that this
was not a proper case for an award of punitive damages, the court
relied on two 1958 decisions, Bryson v. Bramlett2s and McDonald V.
Stone,2 6 and concluded: "The Chancery Courts of this State have ample
jurisdiction to award exemplary or punitive damages in proper cases,
and the case at bar was a proper one for the application of that juris27
diction."
This broad declaration can only be accepted with a cautionary
reservation. The McDonald case, decided by the same section of the
court of appeals, did indeed involve an award of punitive damages in
a chancery court. However, the cause of action was for ejectment,
and thus the chancery court was deciding a common law case and
was proceeding according to the damages rules long followed by the
law courts.28 The Bryson case, decided by the Tennessee Supreme
Court, was an action by a borrower to recover usurious interest paid
to his lender-also a common law cause of action. The court of appeals opinion contained no discussion of chancery's power to award
22. Charles B. James' Land & Inv. Co. v. Vernon, supra note 20 at 644-45,

168 S.W. at 157, quoting 36 Cyc. 738 (1910). See also DE FUNIAK, MODERN
EQuITY 195 (2d ed. 1956); PomRoy, op. cit. supra note 21, § 1407; WALSH, op.
cit. supranote 4, § 76.
23. Smedley, EquitVy-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND. L. REV. 1191 (1959).
24. 336 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
25. 321 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn. 1958).
26. 321 S.W.2d 845 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958).

27. Kneeland v. Bruce, 336 S.W.2d 319, 325 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
28. Note 26 supra. The complainant also asked for removal of a cloud on
complainant's title, but defendants freely admitted that they had no claim
or pretense of ownership of the property in question, and the case seems
to have developed entirely as one for ejectment and damages.
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punitive damages, and the cases cited by the supreme court to demonstrate the existence of this power in Tennessee did not include any
instances in which traditional equitable relief was sought.29 Since
the Kneeland case also involved a legal cause of action, the Tennessee
courts have yet to decide whether in Tennessee, contrary to the
majority view,30 a punitive damages award is proper in a traditional
equity case. However, since on three occasions in the past three
years the upper courts have recognized the power of chancery courts
to grant such damages, without any -qualification being stated in
regard to the nature of the cause of action, it appears that the "proper
cases" referred to in the rule of the Kneeland decision are intended to
include those falling within the inherent jurisdiction of equity.
IV. INJUNCTION AGAINST COUNTY'S PERPETRATION OF A NuisANcE
With the decision in Jones v. Knox County,31 the Tennessee Supreme Court appears to have restored, after a lapse of exactly one
year, the rule that a county may be enjoined from perpetrating a
nuisance, even though the wrong is being committed by the county
while acting in its governmental capacity. A property owner sued to
restrain the county and its board of education from maintaining a
nuisance in the form of a sewage treatment plant at a public school,
which plant was allegedly so operated as to emit noxious odors,
attract flies, and discharge filth into an open ditch near plaintiff's
home. The chancellor overruled defendants' demurrer and granted a
temporary injunction, and the supreme court affirmed, observing
that the decision was in accord with the general rule and specific
Tennessee cases, including Pearce v. Gibson County.3 The decision
in Buckholtz v. Hamilton County,33 in which a county was held immune from liability for injuries caused by a nuisance, was said to
have no application in the instant case because it involved a tort action
for damages.
Both the reasoning and result appearing to be sound and satisfactory, this case would pass without further comment if it were not for
the remarkable contrast it presents to a decision handed down by the
same court just a year earlier, the same justice writing both opinions.
In Wright v. Roane County,34 it was held that equity could not enjoin
a county from maintaining a nuisance caused by a faulty drainage
system set up in the construction of a highway. In both cases, the
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See Smedley, supra note 23, at 1195-96.
Id. at 1192-95.
327 S.W.2d 473 (Tenn. 1959).
107 Tenn. 224, 64 S.W. 33 (1901).
180 Tenn. 263, 174 S.W.2d 455 (1943).
315 S.W.2d 97 (Tenn. 1958).
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county was acting in a governmental capacity in maintaining the
alleged nuisance, and in both cases a private property owner injured
by the alleged wrong was the complainant, and in both cases injunctive relief only was sought. Yet, in the earlier case, the court denied
the injunction, discussing the Buckholtz case at length as authority
for the holding, and ignoring the Pearce case altogether, while in the
later case the injunction was granted on the authority of the Pearce
case, and the Buckholtz case was ruled to be inapplicable. Inasmuch
as the Wright decision was not referred to in the Jones opinion, one
can only wonder what differences the court found in the two cases
which justified the different results.
It has been previously observed by this writer that the Wright
opinion was somewhat indefinite as to the exact basis of the holding in
the case. 35 The Jones case, unfortunately, does nothing to resolve that
uncertainty, but it may be approved as a welcome indication that the
court did not actually intend to immunize counties from all responsibility to property owners in regard to tortious actions committed in
carrying out governmental functions.

V.

RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN CHANCERY CASES

Several recent cases dealt with the question of the jury trial right
in equity, and by the decision in Moore v. Mitchell, the most recent
of this group, the supreme court declared that it was attempting "to
-36 The current uncertainties regarding
put the matter at rest ....
the scope of the jury trial right in chancery court proceedings arose
out of the ambiguous language of Code section 21-1011, enacted in
1932. Prior to that date, either party was entitled to demand a jury
trial on any issue of fact in any chancery case.37 In the 1932 Code, the
scope of the right to jury trial was modified by excepting "cases involving complicated accounting, as to such accounting, and those elseThe Tenneswhere exc.epted by law or by provision of this Code ......
see Supreme Court soon took note of the effect of these qualifications,
observing in Hunt v. Hunt: "So it is not every case in chancery in
which a jury can be demanded and . . . the chancellor has a much
broader latitude in withdrawing issues from a jury than the circuit
judge does in directing a verdict. ' '38 The opinion then went on: "A
case involving a parol trust is not a proper case in which to submit
35. Smedley, supranote 23, at 1198.
36. 329

S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tenn. 1959).

37. Tenn. Acts 1846, c. 122, § 14. This act was repealed by Tenn. Pub. Acts

1919, ch. 90, § 1 and 2, but was reinstated by Tenn. Pub. Acts 1921, ch. 10,
§ 1. See Note, Jury Trial in Chancery Court in Tennessee, 7 VAND. L. REV. 393,
395 (1954).
38. Hunt v. Hunt, 169 Tenn. 1, 10, 80 S.W.2d 666, 669 (1935).
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to a jury the issue of the creation of the trust unless there is clear
and convincing evidence in favor of the proponent. The chancellor
merely withdraws the issue and has no occasion to charge at all with
39
respect to the fact.
Some uncertainty as to the true import of this decision in regard to
the right to jury trial in equity was manifested in several later cases.40
Finally, in Doughty v. Grills,41 the court of appeals reached the conclusion that Hunt v. Hunt held "that cases of purely equitable cognizance falling under the inherent jurisdiction of the chancery court
... are within the exception to Code Section [21-1011] providing for
juries in chancery,-that is, they are among the cases 'elsewhere
excepted by law or by provisions of this Code. . . .' "
Since the
supreme court denied certiorari, this decision stood unreversed, but
its interpretation of section 21-1011 has been vigorously questioned.43
After prolonged silence, the supreme court has now used Moore v.
Mitchell to clarify the situation. It explained that Hunt v. Hunt did
not set down the rule attributed to it in the Doughty case; rather, the
Hunt case held that while the right to a jury trial exists in cases of
inherent equity jurisdiction, if equity traditionally requires a certain
quantum of proof to establish the claim, complainant must offer
such proof before he is entitled to have a verdict in his favor. The
holding of the Doughty case regarding the meaning of the exception
in section 21-1011 was therefore expressly overruled, and the jury
trial exception was declared to include only cases "which are expressly excepted by the provisions of the Code, and those statutory
exceptions not found in the Code; and such as by their very nature
must necessarily be deemed inappropriate and not a proper case to be
submitted to a jury such as ... (a contempt proceeding for violation
of an injunction), unless in such case express provision for a jury
trial is made by statute; or cases of such a complicated and intricate
nature involving mixed questions of law and fact not suitable for
solution by a jury such as laches or estoppel." 44
Though it may be argued that this decision does not give effect to
the literal words of the exception clauses of section 21-1011, the view
adopted very probably is consistent with the actual intention of the
legislature. For if the exceptions were held to cover all cases of
39. 169 Tenn. at 11, 80 S.W.2d at 669, 670.
40. Greenwood v. Maxey, 190 Tenn. 599 at 611, 231 S.W.2d 315 at 320
(1950); Davis v. Mitchell, 27 Tenn. App. 182 at 196, 178 S.W.2d 889 at 895
(1943).

41. 37 Tenn. App. 63, 260 S.W.2d 379 (E.S. 1952).
42. 37 Tenn.App. at 81, 260 S.W.2d at 386.
43. Note, 23 TENN. L. REV. 230 (1954); Note, 7 VAND. L. Rzv. 393 (1954); 7
VAND.L. REv. 299 (1954).
44. Moore v. Mitchell, supra note 36, at 824, citing 1 GIBSON, SUITS IN CHAN-

CERY §§ 578, 582 (5th ed. 1955).
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inherent equity jurisdiction, the apparent purpose of the section to
confer a broad right to jury trial in chancery cases would be largely
45
nullified.
While the Moore decision may serve to clear away the main element
of confusion created by the Hunt and Doughty cases, it is obvious that
some room for flexible application of the exception clauses of section
21-1011 still exists. Thus, the chancellors must still determine whether
each case "by [its] very nature must necessarily be deemed inappropriate and not a proper case to be submitted to a jury," or is of "a
complicated and intricate nature involving mixed questions of law
and fact not suitable for solution by a jury. . . ." These rather indefinite guides obviously leave wide discretion in the chancellors to be
exercised in the individual cases.
Three other recent Tennessee cases, though decided previous to
Moore v. Mitchell, provide some help in determining the scope and
effect of the jury trial right in equity. In Town of Alamo v. ForcumJames Co.,46 complainant sued the town to recover the balance due on
a contract for construction of a sewage disposal system. At defendant's
request a jury was impanelled, but at the close of the evidence the
chancellor sustained plaintiff's motion to dismiss the jury on the
ground that the issues were too complicated, and involved too many
questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact to be decided
by a jury. In a rehearing opinion, the supreme court sustained the
ruling that this was not a proper case for a jury trial because: .(1)
some issues required interpretation of written documents; and (2)
some issues of fact depended upon there first being a proper construction of the contract. A passage from 1 Gibson, Suits in Chancery47 was
quoted as properly indicating that no jury trial should be allowed
in equity where: (1) a controlling question of law arises; or (2) the
case turns on a point of law alone ("such as the meaning of an instrument, or the legal consequences of facts that are conceded"); or (3)
the questions of fact are so intermixed with questions of law that
the former cannot be considered separately by a jury; or (4) disputes
of fact are so intricate that no clearly defined and determinative questions can be framed for presentation to a jury. In Henry v. Southern
Fire & Cas. Co.,48 on the other hand, the chancellor's withdrawal of
the issues was held to be error. Complainants brought suit on a
liability insurance policy to require the insurer to repay complainants
the amount they had paid to a third party in settlement of claims for
damages for injuries sustained in an accident caused by the operation
of a trailer truck. Defendant contended that the policy did not cover
45. See Note, 7 VAND.L. REv. 393 at 401-04 (1954).
46. 327 S.W.2d 47 (Tenn. 1959).
47. Section 548a (4th ed. 1937).
48. 330 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
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the operation of such trucks, but complainants argued that defendant's
agent had represented that such liability was included when he issued
the policy. The agent denied making the representation. The court
of appeals ruled that the credibility of the agent as defendant's witness (and ultimately the question of what representation was made
to complainants as to the scope of the policy's coverage) should have
been submitted to the jury. The general rule was laid down that:
"If there is any material evidence to sustain a decree on an issue of
fact, which is cognizable, or triable at law, the chancellor must submit
such issue to the jury, and the finding of the jury has the same force
and effect as in a court of law. '49
McDade v. McDade,50 coming before the courts prior to the Moore
decision, was fraught with several issues regarding the right to jury
trial, but the court of appeals neatly avoided the necessity of ruling
on them. Complainants brought suit- in the chancery court to collect
certain sums alleged to be due under a very complex contract of sale,
and defendants filed a cross-bill for rescission of the contract on the
grounds that it was induced by fraud, duress and misrepresentation,
and that one of defendants was mentally incompetent to enter the
contract. The chancellor refused defendants' demand for a jury trial
on the issues of fraudulent inducement and of gross inadequacy of the
consideration for the contract. Subsequently, he impanelled an
advisory jury, but ultimately withdrew the two mentioned issues from
this jury. Since the original bill was based on a common law cause
of action, it could be argued that the demand for jury trial should
have been granted; but since the cross-bill sought traditional equitable
relief, it was arguable that under the Doughty case rule (still in effect
at that time), defendants had no right to jury trial, at least on the
purely equitable issues. Further, since the disputed issues of fact
were of bewildering complexity, it may be contended that even under
the Moore case rule, the chancellor could properly have withdrawn
the issues from the jury. At any rate, defendants, in appealling a
partially adverse judgment, contended that they had not been accorded their right to jury trial. The appellate court, without deciding
whether they had been entitled to a jury trial, ruled that since defendants had made no assignments of error regarding the denial of
their demand for a jury, the chancellor's action became final and was
not subject to review on appeal. The court went on to call attention
to the fact that traditional equity procedure remains in effect to the
extent that even where the parties have no right to a jury trial or
do not invoke such right as exists, the chancellor may still empanel
an advisory jury on his own motion; and he then has full discretion
49. 330 S.W.2d at 29.
50. 325 S.W.2d 575 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1958).
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as to what issues to submit to his jury and what issues he shall himself
decide.
It is to be noted that even under the Moore case rule, an advisory
jury may still be employed by the chancellor in a case in which the
right to jury trial does not exist. However, such a body may seldom
prove to be useful, since it would not be proper to refer a question of
law to a jury, and since if the case is of such a "complicated and intricate nature" as to preclude the right to jury trial, it would seem doubtful that an advisory jury would often be capable of passing on the
issues.

VI. JURISDICTION To INVESTIGATE CHARGES OF UNETHICAL CONDUCT
Acting to resolve a controversy in a situation which has created
widespread public interest in Tennessee, the supreme court ruled that
the chancery courts have inherent jurisdiction to investigate charges
of unethical and unlawful practice of law. 51 The Chattanooga Bar
Association, through its Board of Governors, had filed an original
bill in the Hamilton County Chancery Court asking for an investigation of numerous alleged unethical and unlawful practices by members of the local bar, including the fomenting of litigation, solicitation
of employment, fee-splitting, representation of conflicting interests,
failure to account for fiduciary funds, and obtaining statements and
documents by duress and misrepresentation. No specific offenders
were named, and no specific disciplinary action was sought. Rather,
the petition was for a general investigation by use of Special Masters
appointed by and acting under the direction of the court. However,
the chancellor decided that he lacked jurisdiction to make such a
broad inquiry into conduct of attorneys generally, there being no
specific persons identified as offenders, and that any such action is
within the exclusive power of the state supreme court.
The supreme court reversed and remanded the case to the chancery
court for further proceedings under the petition. Inasmuch as the
continuation of the offenses charged would reflect on the honor and
integrity of all courts, it was declared that "the Chancellor must
exercise his inherent authority to inquire as to who it is among many
officers who are doing these dastardly things .... -52 Supreme Court
Rule 40,53 which lodges authority in the Chief Justice to initiate
investigations of charges of misconduct by attorneys, was held not
to set up an exclusive remedy nor to deny "to trial courts their
inherent authority to discipline members of the Bar, or to entertain
a motion by any lawyer or any Bar Association, to investigate the
54
unethical and unlawful practice of law."
51. Ex parte Chattanooga Bar Ass'n, 330 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1959).
52. 330 S.W.2d at 340. (Emphasis supplied.)
53. See 192 Tenn. 827.
54. 330 S.W.2d at 342.

